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COMMENT
Foundations of Baghdad's
Argument that Regions Lack
Constitutional Authority Over
Oil and Gas Development
Agreements
By Rex J Zedalis*
Iraq's oil wealth is well known. In recent months, the failure of that nation's
legislature to adopt a national oil law, and the interest of a variety of smaller
and mid-sized international oil companies in exploiting the oil riches of
the more stabile Kurdish Region, have combined to result in the Kurdish
Regional Government striking oil development agreements with roughly
a dozen separate entities. The legal validity of these agreements may be
questioned under the terms of the Iraqi Constitution. In what follows, an
effort is made to detail the most persuasive and forceful legal arguments that
could be proffered by the central government to counter claims of regional
governments possessing constitutional authority to enter into development
agreements like those negotiated by the Kurds. In short, these arguments
are based on the notion of the Constitution not assigning control over oil
and gas activity to sub-central governmental entities.
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The failure of the Iraqi federal legislature to adopt a national hydrocarbons
law,' and the recent news reports about several exploration and development
agreements negotiated between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
and officials of international oil companies such as Norway's DNO, Britain's
Sterling Energy and America's Hunt Oil,2 suggest the need to articulate the legal
basis for Baghdad's view that the agreements exceed the powers provided to
regional governmental units by the terms of the Iraqi Constitution.3 The author
* RexJ Zedalis is Professor of Law and Director, Comparative and International Law
Center, and Fellow, National Energy-Environment Law and Policy Institute, University
of Tulsa; W B Cutting Fellow in International Law (1980-81) andJSD (1987), Columbia
University. He can be contacted by e-mail at rex-zedalis@utulsa.edu. The author would
like to express his appreciation to R Dobie Langenkamp, former Professor of Law and
Director, National Energy-Environment Law & Policy Institute, University of Tulsa, and
consultant to the US Department of Energy on Iraqi oil and gas law matters, for his
invaluable discussions, comments and insights. The views herein represent those of the
author and not those of Professor Langenkamp or the US Government.
I See 'Official says Iraqi oil talks deadlocked', Iraq Updates (14 September 2007),
available at www.iraqupdates.com/p-articles.php/article21766 (accessed 17 October
2007); 'A vital oil law for Iraqis', Iraq Updates (17 September 2007), available at www.
iraqupdates.com/p-articles.php/article2l846 (accessed 17 October 2007); 'The rise
and fall of Iraq's oil law', Iraq Updates (21 September 2007), available at www.iraqup-
dates.com/p articles.php/article22008 (accessed 17 October 2007); 'Parliament delays
voting on law', Iraq Updates (9 October 2007), available at www.iraqupdates.com/
p-articles.php/article22671 (accessed 17 October 2007); 'Deputy PM says Iraq some
way off oil agreement', Iraq Updates (18 October 2007), available at www.iraqupdates.
com/p-articles.php/article22976 (accessed 19 October 2007).
2 On these three specific contracts see 'DNO sees no threat to Kurdistan oil deal', Iraq
Updates (19 November 2006), available at www.iraqupdates.com/p-articles.php/ar-
ticlel1920 (accessed 28 December 2006); 'Sterling eyes Kurdish deals', Iraq Updates (20
August 2007), available at www.iraqupdates.com/p-articles.php/article20837 (accessed 3
October 2007); 'Texas oil company signs deal with Kurdistan government', Iraq Updates
(10 September 2007), available at www.iraqupdates.com/particles.php/article2l523
(accessed 30 September 2007). For deals with companies such as Turkey's Genel Energi,
Switzerland's Addax, and the UAE's Dana Gas see generally, 'Genel Energi and Addax
Petroleum announce the execution of a revised production sharing agreement in respect
to the Taq Taq field', Iraq Updates (23 November 2006), available at www.iraqupdates.
com/particles.php/article 12038 (accessed 28 December 2006); 'Dana Gas, Kurdish
PSA plan', Iraq Updates (23 April 2007), available at www.iraqupdates.com/partices.
php/articlel6717 (accessed 3 May 2007). Iraq Updates, available at www.iraqupdates.com
provides excellent coverage of these and other KRG deals.
3 See 'New Iraqi Kurdish oil law may trigger confrontation with Baghdad, won't attract
leading oil companies', Iraq Updates (14 August 2007), available at www.iraqupdates.
com/p.articles.php/article20620 (accessed 1 September 2007); 'Iraqi oil minister says
Hunt Oil deal with Kurd regional government illegal', Iraq Updates (11 September
2007), available at www.iraqupdates.com/p-articles.php/article21638 (accessed 14
September 2007). For the Kurds' defence of the contracts, see 'KRG responds to Dr
Shahristani's recent statements on oil', Iraq Updates (12 September 2007), available at
www.iraqupdates.com/p-articles.php/article2l660 (accessed 14 September 2007); 'Iraq's
Kurdish administration wants oil minister sacked', Iraq Updates (17 September 2007),
available at www.iraqupdates.com/particles.php/article21837 (accessed 1 October
2007); 'Iraq's Kurdistan defends oil deals', Iraq Updates (9 October 2007), available at
www.iraqupdates.com/p-articles.php/article22691 (accessed 15 October 2007).
FOUNDATIONS OF BAGHDAD'S ARGUMENT
has argued elsewhere that regional governments possess the constitutional
authority independently to enter into agreements like those struck by the
KRG.4 Without equivocating on or changing positions regarding this matter,
the author is prepared to acknowledge that the many ambiguities and broadly
drafted provisions of the Iraqi Constitution leave room for contending that
regional authority is far from crystal clear. For this and other reasons, it seems
important to set out the specifics of the strongest legal argument that might
support the position that the Constitution does not grant regional units the
necessary power to enter into oil development agreements.
In what follows, that particular objective will be approached by first
describing for the reader the overall structure of the Iraqi Constitution
and the essence of its relevant provisions. Thereafter, both the general and
the specific powers assigned to the federal government and implicating oil
development agreements will be examined. Subsequently, reference will be
made to the significance of the relationship between those constitutional
powers assigned exclusively to the federal government, those designated by
the Constitution as shared, and those left to be exercised as mere collaborative
powers. This brief commentary's final substantive section then takes up the
effect of the constitutional language declaring oil and gas a resource held
by all the peoples of Iraq.
Two things should be kept in mind when approaching the arguments,
evaluations and ideas reflected herein. For openers, the analysis of the
constitutional provisions examined proceeds without the benefit of the kind
of exhaustive, official negotiating record available on the constitutions of
some other nations. As is well-known, the Iraqi Constitution was the product
of substantial political compromise between ethnic factions and religious
persuasions, all willing to give on some issues and not on others in order
to secure self-governance and portray to the international community at
least the semblance of national progress and stability. Absent, however, is
any comprehensive, authoritative and formal negotiating record that would
inform the meaning of unclear constitutional provisions to any greater
extent than the very language of the provisions themselves. The other thing
to keep in mind goes without saying and concerns the fact that the mode of
reasoning by which the analysis proceeds tracks the traditional approach of
systematic, deductive, rational argumentation. It is certainly possible some
may find fault with this approach, suggesting instead that, when dealing with
constitutions that emerge out of distinctive cultures with unique methods of
analysis and inquiry resolution, the interpretive approach should reflect the
culture itself. The legitimacy of such an observation cannot be denied, but
4 RexJ Zedalis, 'Recent Oil Contracts With Kurdish Authorities: Are They Legally Valid?'
Int'l Energy L & Taxation Rev (forthcoming 2008).
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unfortunately the author's training and knowledge confine the analytical
framework to that familiar to practitioners of the common and the civil law
traditions of European countries.
A primer on the structure and relevant provisions of the
Constitution
The provisions of the Iraqi Constitution5 relevant to the question of regional
authority independently to enter into oil development agreements fall into
four basic categories. In an effort simply to provide contextual orientation,
not interpretive conclusions, it may prove of some value succinctly to describe
the essence of those categories and set them into the overall structure of
the Iraqi Constitution.
The first category of relevance is captured by the language of Article 110.
It sets out a moderately lengthy list of powers that are exclusive to the federal
government.6 These powers can neither be claimed nor exercised by the
regions or governorates in Iraq. Though a variety of important powers are
provided as exercisable by the federal government alone, those most apposite
to oil development agreements include the powers over formulating foreign
'economic and trade policy', and 'regulating commercial policy'.7 Obviously,
the powers mentioned are general, and do not relate solely to the matter of
oil development agreements.
The second category is captured in Article 114.8 This Article provides for
the powers that the federal government must share with the regions. Again,
as with Article 110, many powers not at all associated with oil development
agreements are listed. One that could play a role in that respect, however, is
the power to formulate 'development and general planning policies'.9 But
even here, Article 114 simply provides for a power that, again, is extremely
broad and capable of applying to far more than agreements concerning oil
exploration and development. It is also worth re-emphasising that all the powers
referenced in Article 114 are powers shared between the federal government
and the regions, not powers exclusive to the regions themselves.
The third category recognises that the combined effect of Articles 110 and
114 fails to exhaust all possible powers that governments, whether federal or
sub-central, may wish to exercise. As a consequence, the Constitution then
5 See Iraqi Constitution, available at www.export.gov/iraq/pdf/iraqi_constitution.pdf
(accessed 11 October 2007).
6 See ibid at Art 110.
7 See ibid at Art 110, First and Third.
8 See ibid at Art 114.
9 See ibid at Art 114, Fourth.
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sets about to assure that all such residual powers are assigned. In addressing
that task, Article 115's first sentence provides: 'All powers not stipulated in
the exclusive powers of the federal government belong to the authorities
of the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region.'10 In
light of the fact neither Article 110 nor 114 explicitly speaks to power over
matters involving oil and gas, it would make sense to think of Article 115's
reservation as doing so indirectly. However, account must still be taken of
Article 112."
Article 112 represents one of the provisions that comprises the fourth
category of relevance. It speaks directly and explicitly to the matter of oil and
gas by way of two provisions. In the opening one, Article 112, First, it provides
that the federal government, not on its own but in collaboration with the
regions and governorates, has power over the 'management' of oil and gas. 12
This power relates to oil and gas extracted from so-called 'present' oil and
gas fields. 3 The exact language of that provision states that: '[t] he federal
government, with the producing governorates and regional governments,
shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields
.... 14 In the other provision, Article 112, Second, the federal government
is provided with the additional collaborative authority to undertake the
formulation of 'strategic policies' for developing oil and gas resources
generally. 15 In contradistinction to Article 112, First's, assignment over day-
to-day 'management' operations of oil and gas fields, 6 the Constitution's
10 See ibid at Art 115. Article 115's second sentence is also interesting and important in
situations where powers 'shared' between federal and sub-central authorities conflict
with each other. That sentence reads: 'With regard to other powers shared between the
federal government and the regional governments, priority shall be given to the law of
the regions and governorates not organized in a region in case of dispute.'
11 See ibidatArt 112.
12 See ibid.
13 See ibid at Art 112, First.
14 See ibid. The balance of Art 112, First, is also of importance. Immediately following its
indication that the federal government, with the producing governorates and regional
governments, are to undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present
fields, it declares the condition: 'provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair man-
ner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country, specify-
ing an allotment for a specified period for the damaged regions which were unjustly
deprived of them by the former regime, and the regions that were damaged afterwards
in a way that ensures balanced development in different areas of the country, and this
shall be regulated by law.'
15 See ibid at Art 112, Second. The precise language of Art 112, Second, reads: 'The
federal government, with the producing regional and governorate governments, shall
together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth
in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced
techniques of the market principles and encouraging investment.'
16 See ibidat Art 112, First.
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assignment in Article 112, Second, of the power to formulate strategic policy
for developing those resources, is both broad-ranging and forward looking.
That is to say, it is concerned with the creation of plans to bring about the
most productive use of Iraq's oil and gas resources, notjust the oversight and
rationality of current activities related to actual practices in the field.
The other constitutional provision represented in the fourth category is
Article I11.7 As with Article 112, Article 111 also deals very explicitly and
directly with oil and gas. In contradistinction to Article 112, however, it
contains a single legal principle, one that is significantly more general in
nature. As noted, Article 112's two paragraphs address the management of oil
and gas extracted from present fields, and the creation of strategic policies
for the overall development of Iraq's oil and gas resources. Article 111, on
the other hand, provides simply that Iraq's oil and gas resources are owned
by all the people of Iraq."s Though not explicitly alluding to allocations of
constitutional power between the federal and sub-central governmental
units, its declaration that the nation's oil and gas resources belong to the
Iraqi people is not entirely inconsequential.
From the combination of these provisions, it is easy to understand how one
could arrive at the conclusion expressed elsewhere by the author that it is each
of the regional governmental units in Iraq, and not the federal government
in Baghdad, that is vested with the constitutional authority to enter oil
development agreements similar to those negotiated by the KRG. 19 After
all, Article 110, which lists the powers exclusive to the federal government,
makes no mention of such authority, and Article 114, which lists the powers
to be shared with the regions, finds itself in a comparable situation. Article
112 does speak to oil and gas, but is limited in its reach to 'management' of
'present fields', and 'strategic [development] policies' concerning oil and
gas generally. The result is to place reliance on both Article 115's reference
to residual powers, all of which remain in the regions and governorates, and
its reference to sub-central power 'trumping' inconsistent federal measures
whenever power is to be shared between the federal government and the
sub-central units.2" However, despite the attractiveness of the conclusion that
regional governments possess the constitutional power to strike the kinds
of oil development agreements entered into by the KRG, several solid legal
arguments exist in favour of the view that only the federal government is
17 See ibidatArt 111.
18 See ibid (referencing the fact that that includes the people 'in all the regions and gov-
ernorates').
19 See n 4 above.
20 See ibid at Art 115, second sentence, quoted in n 10 above.
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vested with such power.2 1 In large measure, as revealed below, these arguments
emphasise the reach of some of the general powers assigned exclusively to
the federal government by Article 110, the lead role to be played by federal
authorities under Article 112's specific powers over managing present oil
and gas fields, and formulating 'strategic policies' for developing any and
all oil and gas fields, and the declaration in Article 111 that Iraq's oil and
gas resources are owned by all the peoples of that nation.
Articles 110 and 112: the general powers over both 'economic and
trade policy' and 'commercial policy', and the specific powers over
oil and gas 'management' and 'strategic [development] policies'
The general powers over economic and trade policy, as well as commercial
policy, that are assigned exclusively to the federal government by Article 110
can be viewed as envisioning no room for sub-central governmental units
independently to enter into oil development agreements. Clearly, oil and
gas activity anywhere within the territory of Iraq has ramifications for the
nation's economic policy. Every decision to facilitate or not the exploration
for and exploitation of oil and gas sends ripples through the economy, thereby
having an impact on policy regarding the economy. And given that such
hydrocarbons are produced neither for the mere sake of production, nor for
domestic consumption alone, their sale for export on to the international
market has consequences for trade policy as well. In light of this, would it
not make sense for one to think that the act of negotiating, structuring and
finalising an oil development agreement would impinge on powers assigned
exclusively to the federal government?
Likewise with respect to Article 110's federal government power over
commercial policy; surely that assignment of exclusive constitutional
authority encompasses all things involving commercial transactions. By
21 There have been few detailed analyses of the question of constitutional authority to
enter oil development agreements. For a brief analysis arguing the power is assigned to
the federal government, see Memorandum, Joseph C Bell and Professor Cheryl Saun-
ders, Iraqi Oil Policy - Constitutional Issues Regarding Federal and Regional Authority
(7 July 2006), available at www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/reports/MEMORANDUMCons
titutional%20Interpretation.DOC (accessed 15 October 2007). See also Tariq Shafiq,
'Kurdistan Regional Government Hydrocarbon Law: A Commentary', 49 Middle East
Economic Survey (No 37) (18 September 2006), available at www.mees.com/postedar-
ticles/oped/v49n38-50D0.htm (accessed 15 October 2007). Leaving open the door
that regional governments possess at least limited power to enter into oil development
agreements, see Haider Ala Hamoudi, 'The Hunt Oil Dispute and the Future of Iraqi
Federalism', JURIST: Legal News & Research (9 October 2007), available at http://ju-
rist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/09/hunt-oil-dispute-and-future-of-iraqi.php (accessed
12 October 2007).
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vesting the federal government in Baghdad with the sole power to regulate
commercial policy, the drafters of the Constitution must have anticipated
that the terms and provisions of all contractual arrangements, including
those looking towards the development of oil and gas resources, would
have to comply with requirements established by federal statutory or
regulatory standards. In other words, if sub-central governmental units
were acknowledged as possessing constitutional power autonomously to
strike international oil development agreements - indisputably a form of
commercial contract- would that not mean Article 110's assignment to the
federal government of exclusive power over the regulation of commercial
policy could be seriously undercut? Accepting this as so, it would certainly
seem to make sense to read the Constitution's assignment of power over
commercial policy exclusively to the federal government as a rejection of
the notion that regional authorities have the power to negotiate, structure
and finalise oil development agreements.
To the extent one may be reluctant to place too much weight on Article
110's assignment of more general powers, it is obvious that Article 112's
specific powers connected with oil and gas buttress the claim that, at least
with regard to so-called 'present fields', 22 striking oil development agreements
is the sole province of federal governmental authorities. This emerges from
the fact that Article 112, First, provides that the 'federal government, with
the producing governorates and regional governments', is to undertake the
'management' of oil and gas extracted from present fields. 23 As with Article
110's assignment to the federal government of power regarding foreign
economic and trade policy, as well as overall commercial policy, Article 112,
First's, grant to the federal government, albeit in collaboration with sub-
central units, of the power over the management of present fields suggests
superior authority at the level of the central government in Baghdad. True,
the federal government is not entitled to exercise a management authority
over present fields that ignores or disregards the input of the sub-central
units. While management must be collaborative, the very language of Article
112 makes clear that it is the federal government that is to take the lead
role. The implication is that, in the event of disagreement, it is the desires of
the federal government that are to be preferred. Further, in executing the
22 See text accompanying n 13 above.
23 See Iraqi Constitution, n 5 above, at Art 112, First. It cannot be stressed strongly
enough that the management authority over present fields is not unconditionally
assigned to the federal government, with the sub-central governmental units. Article
112, First, contains a proviso that conditions the management authority. The proviso is
constructed around the obligation of the federal government to meet specific revenue
distribution obligations, obligations that look towards a fair and equitable distribution
of all revenues throughout the country.
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collaborative role, the functions of the federal government are to concern
the actual task of oil and gas management. And,just as Article 1 10's exclusive
federal powers over economic, trade and commercial policy can serve to
obstruct regional claims to a right to enter into oil development agreements,
so Article 112, First's, authority over management can have the same effect.
After all, how is it possible for federal officials effectively to manage oil and
gas in present fields, if the various sub-central units are entitled independently
to strike international oil development agreements?
The grant of power in Article 112, Second, concerning 'strategic
[development] policies' for oil and gas is not limited to present fields.24 In
this important respect, it differs from the first paragraph of that Article.
Nonetheless, in reiteration of the notion that the federal government is
to take the lead role in collaboratively formulating strategic development
policies regarding oil and gas, it parallels Article 112's just discussed
management provision. Along that same line, the reference in Article 112,
Second, to 'strategic [development] policies' is plainly broad enough to bring
within its reach as many sorts of practices and transactions as are caught both
by the other relevant grants of power exclusive to the federal government in
Article 110, and by the oil and gas management function concerning which
the federal government is to take the lead role in collaborating with sub-
central units. By its very nature, oil and gas strategic development policies
are affected every time a development agreement to explore for and exploit
oil and gas is struck. Strategic development policies outline plans regarding
the production of such resources, and development agreements necessarily
have an impact on the implementation of those policies. Thus, there is
little reason to believe that the drafters of the Constitution, in assigning
the federal government the lead role in collaborating on the creation of
strategic development policies concerning oil and gas resources, envisioned
the sub-central units being vested with constitutional authority to enter into
international contracts regarding such. Presumably, the power to do so was
viewed as implicitly vested in federal authorities alone.
Significance of the second sentence of Article 115
As noted earlier, Article 115 of the Iraqi Constitution provides that powers
not assigned exclusively to the federal government are retained by the sub-
central units.2 5 Essentially, this means powers not granted to the federal
government by Article 110 remain in the regions and governorates. The
24 See ibidat Art 112, Second.
25 See text accompanying n 10 above.
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second sentence of Article 115 provides, as also seen, that sub-central power
'trumps' inconsistent exercises of federal power in those areas where the
federal and sub-central authorities have shared powers. The interesting
question thus present has to do with possible conflicts arising from regional
authorities entering in to oil development agreements that federal authorities
argue are inconsistent with either the grant to federal authorities under
Article 112, First, of management powers concerning present fields, or the
parallel grant under Article 112, Second, of powers concerning strategic
development policies regarding all oil and gas fields.
In closely reading the second sentence of Article 115, it is clear
that its scope is limited to conflicts arising from constitutional powers
designated as 'shared'. There can be no doubt this extends to all those
powers listed in Article 114; powers that the federal government cannot
exercise exclusively, but in which the federal government must allow the
regional governmental units to participate. While it is arguable that Article
112's powers over management of present fields, and the formulation of
strategic development policies associated with oil and gas resources, are
to be shared between federal authorities and the sub-central units, the
distinction between Article 110's exclusive powers, Article 114's shared
powers and Article 112's collaborative powers cannot be ignored. Article
112's powers are neither exclusive to the federal government, nor shared
with the regions in the sense in which Article 114 utilises that term. As
it seems more appropriate to describe the management and strategic
development policies powers of Article 112 as being somewhat less than
exclusively federal, and more than simply shared, Article 115's second
sentence would not apply in the event of a conflict between the desires
of the federal government and those of a sub-central unit regarding an
international oil development agreement. Stated differently, the ability of
sub-central desires to trump inconsistent desires of the federal government
reaches not farther than to those instances in which the two governmental
bodies exercise their Article 114 shared powers. It does not affect situations
in which the federal government relies on its Article 112 lead, collaborative
role over the management of present fields or the creation of strategic
development policies concerning oil and gas resources.
Obviously, when it comes to situations involving federal government
invocation of an exclusive power over economic, trade, or commercial
policy under Article 110, absolutely no possibility exists of sub-central units
trumping federal desires. The specific range of the second sentence of
Article 115 does not extend beyond conflicts in the shared power realm.
And while one might mistakenly regard Article 112's collaborative powers
as shared, there is no possibility of Article 110's powers being looked on in
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that same light. In the event sub-central authorities were to contend that
independently hammered-out international oil development agreements
somehow take priority over federal governmental desires to abstain from
such, it would seem incontrovertible that exclusive federal power regarding
foreign economic and trade policy, as well as general commercial policy,
would be left unaffected by Article 115.
Article 111: oil and gas owned by all Iraqis
From what we have seen, Article 112 contains important powers regarding
oil and gas management and strategic development policies. These powers
are to be exercised by the federal government, with the sub-central units.
Admittedly, the power concerning management is limited to present oil
and gas fields, but within that realm the very notion of management would
seem extensive enough to crowd out any right of regions independently
to enter into oil development agreements, and the additional power
regarding strategic development policies would seem to have the same
effect. Coupling these powers, specific to oil and gas, with the Article 110
more general powers exclusive to the federal government, leaves little room
for acknowledging anything other than that it is the federal government
in Baghdad that has the constitutional authority for striking international
oil development agreements.
Article 114 does reference a shared power concerning 'development and
general planning policies'. And, conceivably, it might be suggested that this
power entitles governmental entities other than the federal government
to negotiate, structure and finalise oil development agreements. The
power specified in Article 114, however, is nothing more than a power of
the federal government that must be shared with the regions. It is not a
power the regions are entitled to exercise alone. While in the event of a
conflict between the federal government's desires concerning that power
and those of the regions, the trumping provision of Article 115's second
sentence would give preference to the regions. It is unlikely, especially
given the broad nature of the exclusive powers assigned to the federal
government by Article 110, and its powers related specifically to oil and
gas under Article 112, that, in defence of a claim of sole federal authority
over oil development agreements, reliance would be placed on a shared
power contained in Article 114.
The other provision of the Iraqi Constitution supporting the federal
government's authority over international agreements regarding the
exploration for and exploitation of the nation's oil and gas resources is
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Article 111. That provision is crystal clear in expressing the fundamental
principle that the oil and gas resources of Iraq belong to the Iraqi people.
The specific language reads: 'Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq
in all the regions and governorates.' 26
Though it might be possible for one to suggest this provision grants
each Iraqi citizen a discrete and legally recognised property interest in the
nation's oil and gas resources, the practical difficulties that would then
be faced by private companies interested in securing contracts to exploit
resources in which so many individuals held identifiable rights would seem
to militate against attributing such a reading to that provision. In short,
such a reading would render Article 111 unworkable. Given this reality, the
explicit, unambiguous and direct nature of the principle set out in Article
111 would seem best read as indicating that the Constitution vests in the
federal government the power to contract in connection with the nation's oil
and gas resources. While it may come to pass that sub-central governmental
units in Iraq admirably perform the task of servicing the peoples of their
regions and governorates, it is the federal government in Baghdad that
gives full effect to the notion of representing and acting for all the peoples
of all the regions and governorates. The federal government mirrors, in a
rough sense, the ethnic, religious, ideological, regional and tribal elements
present in the nation as a whole. In view of this, why should anyone conclude
anything but that Article 111 emphasises the point the federal government
alone has the power to contract regarding the nation's oil and gas resources?
As the sole representative of all Iraq's peoples, the federal government is
the entity entitled to take the actions which transform into legal measures
the significance of the Article in the Constitution's declaration that all Iraqis
own the nation's oil and gas resources.
Were the position to be taken that Article 111 somehow vests regional
governments with that power, there would be little question that the
governments of the sub-central units with physical control over oil and
gas resources would be likely to give an entirely different meaning to that
provision. The inclination to engage in exploitation for the economic
advantage of their populations alone would be irresistible. However, two
problems exist which seem to foreclose reading Article Ill's reference as
assigning to any unit other than the federal governmental unit the power
to give full and complete effect to ownership. First, it is clear that not all
the sub-central units with oil and gas resources have entirely homogeneous
ethnic and religious groupings. And secondly, it is equally as clear that, even
among the regions of the country in which a certain ethnic or religious
26 See text accompanying n 17 above.
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group predominates, nature itself has seen fit to provide far less than a fair
or proportionate distribution of oil and gas resources. As a consequence
of these two problems, it certainly appears the intent of Article 111 was to
leave absolutely no confusion about the fact that the federal government
in Baghdad, a government representative of all the rival ethnic, religious,
ideological, regional and tribal groupings in the country, is the official unit
vested with the constitutional power to give meaningful and practical effect
to the declaration that the nation's oil and gas resources are owned by all the
Iraqi people. Leaving implementation of that provision to the sub-central
authorities would allow each region of the country blessed with oil and
gas to deny the benefits to either those regions less well endowed, or even
minority populations within their own region. By interpreting Article 111
as vesting in the federal government the power to translate an admirable
constitutional principle into day-to-day application, not only is such an
unattractive and potentially destructive situation avoided, but Article 111
is read in a manner that comports with the meaning of the Constitution's
other relevant provisions.
Conclusion
The notion thatArticles 110, 111, 112, 114 and 115 of the Iraqi Constitution
all support the view that the Iraqi federal government alone is vested with
authority to strike oil development agreements with international oil and gas
companies is entirely consistent with the Constitution's expressions regarding
the centrality of a unified and cohesive nation state. In the event governmental
units other than at the federal level were seen as vested with the power to enter
into oil development agreements, centrifugal forces impelling Iraqi ethnic and
religious groups towards separation and eventual national disintegration would
be unleashed. Such would prove entirely contrary to the pre-eminent value of
Iraq as 'a singlefederal, independent and fully sovereign state', as expressed in
the Constitution's Article 1,27 and to the charge in Article 109 that the 'federal
authorities shall preserve the unity' of the nation and its federal democratic
system.28 The Constitution's expression of both these concepts underpins the
position that the other relevant provisions of that document are best construed
as providing only the federal government with the authority to consummate
development agreements related to the nation's oil resources.
In the end, the complexity of the political, security and social problems faced
by Iraq make it next to impossible to forecast with any degree of certainty what
the precise outcome is likely to be over the intensifying struggle between federal
27 See Iraqi Constitution, n 5 above, at Art 1. Italics added.
28 See ibid at Art 109. Italics added.
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and sub-central governmental authorities regarding oil. Entrenched suspicions
and power rivalries have clearly complicated and impeded the potential for the
adoption of national legislation on oil and gas matters. There is little reason
to believe that a complete reversal on that front will occur anytime soon;
and this despite both expressions of dissatisfaction from, and the exertion of
political pressure by, officials in the United States and other countries allied
with Iraq. The obvious advantage of national legislation, regardless of how it
finally addresses the issue of whether sub-central units will be acknowledged as
having legal power to negotiate oil development agreements, is that its adoption
will come at the cost of those in and outside Baghdad taking on a stake in the
legislation's long-term success. In the absence of a national hydrocarbons law,
however, any attempt to evaluate the propriety of claims to legal authority to
enter into oil development agreements must turn on reference to the provisions
of the Iraqi Constitution. Though not speaking explicitly to that matter, the
relevant provisions of the Constitution can certainly be construed as assigning
to the federal government alone the power to strike such agreements. 9
29 On efforts to further strengthen the Constitution, and especially Arts 111 and 112, on
the power of the federal government when it comes to oil, see Christopher M Blanchard,
CRS Report for Congress - Iraq: Oil and Gas Legislation, Revenue Sharing, and US Policy
at 9-10 (updated 25July 2007) (Congressional Research Service Order Code RL34064).
